An investigation of the integrated commodity program proposed by the United Nations Conference on trade and development, 1984 by Zeremariam, Amanuel (Author) & Boston, Thomas D. (Degree supervisor)
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE INTEGRATED COMMODITY
PROGRAM PROPOSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR






DE D I CATION
This study is dedicated to the memory of my father, Zeremariam
Azzazi Racka, who died in the year I started my graduate study, and who
has given me a past of which I am very proud. I aspire to carry on his
essential characters of honesty and hard work. Most of all, however, I
aspire and strive to attain his level of dedication to the goals and
aspirations of the masses of our country.
—1—
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The completion of this study would have been much more difficult,
if not impossible without the solid support of two people. First,
Dr. Thomas Boston, who as Chairman, instructor, thesis advisor, and
above all as a friend, has steered me and directed me, such that I may
see through the cloudy mists of academic instruction, deeper, and have
a penetrating insight and better understanding of the world in general
and economics in particular. For this, his warm simplicity and keen
sharpness I shall ever be indebted.
Second, my sister Resta Zeremariam, who not only totally supported
me at a time I was unable to work due to my illness, but who also picked
up my expensive hospitalization and medication bills. The years I spent
at Atlanta University were uneasy due to my illness and circumstances it
created. However, thanks to Dr. Boston and Resta these years were trying
but evolving, they have been difficult but enriching, and they have been
grinding but rewarding.
I also like to thank another sister, Dehab Zeremariam, whose encour
agement, help and love served as a continuous source of inspiration.
Most of all however, I thank her for her belief in me which never wavered
at any time.
I also like to thank Dr. Fred Boadu and Mr. Keith Hinch for sitting
in my oral exam and for their invaluable comments, criticisms and
suggestions. Finally, I thank my competent secrectarial consultant and




ZEREMARIAM, AMANUEL B.A.., Central State University, 1977
An Investigation of the Integrated Commodity Program Proposed by the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Advisor: Professor Thomas D. Boston
Thesis dated February 27, 1984
This research is basically intended to look at the problem facing
developing nations. The developing nations comprise the majority of
humanity today, and yet it is very unfortunate that the people in these
nations live amidst abject poverty, diseases, hunger, malnutrition, and
above all, a lack of control of their own destiny. A minority of
humanity has benefited from a sustained economic growth. This part is
largley concentrated in the developed nations of Europe, North America,
New Zealand, and Japan.
One of the major points of economic contact between developing
and developed nations is through international markets. The developing
nations depend on the export of primary commodities for the majority of
their foreign exchange, which they need for food, machinery imports, and
overall development. The developing countries have long sought a bigger
voice in the operation of the world’s raw material markets. Having
taken control of most of the primary commodity production in their
territories after the end of colonialism, these countries found that
the terms of trade between primary commodities and manufactures became
increasingly unfavorable during the 1950’s and 1960’s. Moreover,
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fluctuations in commodity prices and earnings, largely outside their
control, contributed to internal instability and were seen as damaging
to the development process. The pressures for control of commodity
markets found a natural focus in the United Nations Conference for
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Beginning with the first UNCTAD session
in 1964, commodity questions became increasingly important in the UNCTAD
meetings and became the central focus in UNCTAD IV in Nairobi in 1976,
which called for the “Integrated Programme for Commodities.”
The intention of this research is to first look at the inequalities
between developed and developing nations and the historical , social
political, and economic factors that attributed to them since colonization.
Second, since international markets are the key determinant of the
developing nation’s foreign exchange earning necessary for development,
this study will look at the role of trade to the developing nations.
As an alternative to the problems faced in the present trade practices
by the developing nations, this study will finally look at the theoretical
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INTRODUCTION
World’s economic activities are so interrelated that many economic
policies and decisions undertaken in one country often influence many
other countries. This is particularly true in the case of international
trade. One way of classifying of the world’s economy is by designating
developed and developing countries.
The developed economies have attained a high level of modern techno
logy which stimulates their growth. They also have a greater degree of
control over the world market. As a result, in general , the people in
these economies enjoy a better standard of living. The prevailing
international economic order has brought about an unprecedented expansion
and prosperity to the developed market economies. ‘Taking the twenty
years from 1952 to 1972 the total gross product of the developed market
economies rose from $1,250 billion to about $3,070 billion. In terms
of 1973 prices the increment alone ($1,810 billion) being three and a
half times the aggregate gross product of the developing countries in
1972 ($520 billion).” This fact indicates the existence of basic
weaknesses in the mechanisms that link the economies of the two groups
of countries.
The developing countries not only have very limited control to
shape economic events over their own destiny but also their people (sixty
‘New Directions and New Structures for Trade and Development, Report
by the Secretary—General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development to UNCTAD, IV, 1976, p. 7.
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percent of the world’s population) live amidst abject poverty, diseases
and hunger. It is this global economic inequality that many economists
are concerned about. Moreover, today’s most serious economic problem is
how to elevate the majority of humanity from this subhuman condition
because in the final analysis, it is human capital that most influences
devel opment.
One of the main points of contact of developed and developing
countries is through international trade. Gains that arise from inter
national trade influence the saving, invesment, and thereby the growth
of developing nations. As shown in Table 1 below, developed nations in
general export capital goods and finished products, while most developing
nations export natural resources.
In the past years while price index of capital and industrial goods
has been increasing, primary product indexes were relatively low. “The
declining amount of trade in raw materials and the reduced share of the
underdeveloped producers in world trade during the postwar period is
particularly accounted for by the decline in the terms of trade of raw
material commodities relative to industrial products.”2 “...For the
vast majority of underdeveloped countries that import oil, the terms of
trade declined by about one—third at an average annual rate of 1.6
percent for raw materials excludiing petroleum and at an annual average
rate of 2.2 percent, including petroleum over the period 1952 to 1972.”~
“In 1972 this decline in the terms of trade represented a loss of some





COMPOSITION OF WORLD EXPORTS AND IMPORTS,
BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, 1976 (PERCENTAGES)
Developed Developing Centrally
Market Market Planned
Economies Economies Economies World
EXPORTS
Primary products 22.9 81.2 37.0 39.2
Food, beverages, and tobacco 10.8 13.5 9.4 11.3
Crude material (excluding
fuels); oils and fats 7.1 8.7 8.8 7.7
Mineral fuels and related
materials 5.0 59.0 18.8 20.2
Manufatured products 75.7 18.5 56.5 59.2
Chemicals 9.4 1.4 4.8 6.9
Machinery and transport
equipment 37.7 3.7 29.3 28.2
Other manufactured goods 28.6 13.4 22.4 24.1
Miscellaneous 1.4 0.3 6.5 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
I MPORTS
Primary products 42.3 31.0 30.6 39.2
Food, beverages, and tobacco 11.3 10.4 13.5 11.3
Crude material (excluding
fuels); oils and fats 8.5 4.7 7.8 7.7
Mineral fuels and related
materials 22.5 15.9 9.3 20.2
Manufatured products 56.3 65.9 66.3 59.2
Chemicals 6.8 7.4 6.5 6.9
Machinery and transport
equipment 24.5 37.0 34.1 28.2
Other manufactured goods 25.0 21.5 25.7 24.1
Miscellaneous 1.4 3.1 3.1 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Based on data from the United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of
Statistics, Vol. 32, No. 6 (June 1978), Special Table F.
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U. S. ten billion dollars or twenty percent of the underdeveloped non—
oil export earnings from primary commodities.~4
Graph 1 depicts the deviations from the secular trend for a weighted
average of terms of trade of primary commodities.
FIGURE 1
THE WORLD BANK INDEX OF THE TERMS OF TRADE
OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES, 1954—1975
i’)5$ I I Q’fI I \ ~
Source: Jere R. Behrman, Development, the International Economic Order,
and Commodity Agreements, California, 1978, p. 48.





The objective is to look at the structural, political , economic,
and social factors that led to the present wide inequalities between
developed and developing nations. Look at the present trade practices
and its shortcomings. Finally, as a remedy to the present trade
practices investigate the theoretical and empirical aspects of the
“Integrated Commodity Program” proposed by the “United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development”.
The main hypothesis is, if the Integrated Commodity Program is
implemented, it will benefit the developing nations and thereby help in
their overall development process. If this program is implemented not
only with the aim of stabilizating prices but also with an increase in
the secular price trend, then the benefit to the developing nations is
substantial.
CHAPTER I
THE INEQUALITIES OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS
One of the gravest problem facing the world today is the growing
disparity between developed and developing economies. This disparity
has created and is perpetuating the world phenomenon of underdevelopment
which is regarded as the greatest problem of this century.
In most of the developing nations a high proportion of the working
force is engaged in agricultural sector with inadequate farming techniques.
This mode of production hardly produces the necessary resource base for
saving, investment and future development. In practice, therefore a low
income is the cause and effect of the continuing poverty characteristic
of most developing nations. It is important to trace the historical
economic and political legacies that led to the present poverty of the
developing nations.
Most of the developing nations were colonized by western nations.
This colonization took place to accomplish the economic necessities of the
then capitalist societies, such as the need for their capital to obtain
more profits from overseas after exhaustion of the internal profit,
an outlet for new market, and a source of raw materials. At this time
the interest of the western nations was to complement and integrate the
economy of the colonies with their respective economy. This was done
without any regard for the long—run development of the colonies.
Thus western capitalism was integrated with the local economy
of the present developing nations. Trade as one aspect of the overall
economic policy of the western nations had also a role in the process
—6—
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of the complementarity and integration. “The essence of the role of
trade in the integration of African economies into the world capitalist
system was that it promoted complementarity or interdependence, albeit
an ‘unequal interdependence’ between the African economies and the
metropolitan economies. Trade created interdependence through comple—
mentarity by encouraging specialization in the primary production of
raw materials needed by the metropole, while the metropole specialized
in manufacture. This specialization was not simply one of ‘commodities’
produced, it was also reflected in the division of labour.”1
The money income that was attributable to the export of primary
commodities of the colonies went to the consumption of the manufactured
goods in the metropole nations. The consumption theory states as one’s
income increase his consumption of goods increases, especially the
purchase of luxury goods. (At that time the manufactured goods that
were produced at the metropole were considered to be luxury goods for
the colonies.) Therefore as the income from export of primary goods
rose the demand for the manufactured goods increased and thereby the
process of specialization for the production of primary goods by the
colonies and manufactured goods by the metropole was reinforced and
consolidated.
Thus the metropole’s demand for primary products and the self
interested way in which it was satisfied, led to dependent form of
development in the colonies. Infrastructures were also built in the
1Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa, Nigeria, 1981, p. 37.
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colonies mainly to complement the need of this metropole’s demand.
This infractures were only built at port cities or other cities that
were convenient for the transportation of products. “...In so far
colonialism brought about development it was a very haphazard development
the development of enclaves which bore little relation to the other
areas of the economy. The net effect of all this was that the escape
route of the African economy from primary production was blocked.”2
The demand for labour in the colonies was mainly for unskilled
labour. This demand and the easy access to substitutes from the
metropole destroyed the local crafts and craftsmanship. Thus this
whole process of complementarity and integration served two purposes,
i.e. the legacy of dependence to the metropole and the destruction of
local productive forces. This dependence led to the reliance on few
commodity exports for the foreign exchange earnings and development
funds. These five tables indicate the dependency on few commodities
which is characteristic of most developing nations.
Table 2 indicates the dependency of the Republic of Kenya on few
commodities. We can note from the table that coffee, tea, petroleum
products and sisal fibre and tow, comprise 62.8 percent of the total
exports in 1964, while the same products comprised 54.6 percent of the
total export in 1973. Table 3 indicates the percentage of dependency
on single commodity for five African countries from 1938 to 1954. Note
that Egypt’s export of cotton comprised 82.7 percent of the total export
in 1954. Ethiopia’s export of coffee comprised 65.2 percent of its
2Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa, Nigeria, 1981, p. 38.
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total export, while Gambia’s export of groundnuts comprised 76.5 percent
of its total exports in 1954. Table 4 indicates Uganda’s dependence on
few commodities for its export earnings in 1958 to 1961. Note that the
export of coffee alone comprised over seventy—five percent of its total
export earnings in 1959. Table 5 shows Nigeria’s main export commodities
from 1956 to 1958. Note the sharp decline in tonnage and value after
the first four main commodities. Table 6 shows the degree of dependence
on few commodities for five African countries in 1938 and from 1950 to
1957. Note that liberia depended on rubber, iron ore and palm—kernels
for 93.9 percent of its total exports between 1950 to 1957. Algeria
export of citrus fruits alone comprised 39.7 of its total export earnings
between 1950 and 1957.
The process of economic dependency continued even after the political
independence of the developing nations. The new governments did not
enjoy the freedom of building an economy from the start. The economy
that it inherited was fully formed and thus imposed directions on
future development. The course of economic events could only lead to
the reinforcement of dependence and enclave development. This is
reflected in the ratio of urban to rural incomes which in most developing
nations is about 4:1. A good example is the economic dominance of
Abidjan (the capital city) to the other regions in Ivory Coast. Table 7
shows this disparity.
There has also been little change in the resource base of most
developing nations due to concentration on few primary commodities, usually
the ones which have been the mainstay of the economy since colonial days.
Tables 8 and 9 show the picture of a narrow resource base.
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TABLE 2
KENYA, DOMESTIC EXPORTS: PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES, 1964—73 (BY PERCENTAGE)
Commodity 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Coffee, not roasted 32.7 29.9 32.3 29.3 22.2 26.6 31.1 26.8 27.3 29.2
Tea 12.7 12.9 15.0 13.8 17.4 17.8 17.7 16.2 18.1 13.8
Petroleum products 4.6 9.9 10.1 13.8 10.8 12.0 11.4 14.5 9.9 7.7
Sisal fibre and tow 12.8 8.2 5.8 3.9 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.3 3.9
Meat and meat preparations 4.6 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.2 4.1 4.0 5.0 5.4 3.1
Pyrethrum extract and flowers 5.2 4.7 4.9 5.4 5.3 4.4 3.0 4.6 5.0 3.0
Hides, skins and furskins, undressed 2.7 3.7 4.4 3.3 2.9 3.0 2.3 3.3 4.2 4.2
Cement, building 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1
Copper and alloys, unwrought 0.9 1.9 0.7 —— —— —— —— —— —— ——
Wattle—bark and extract 2.3 1.8 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.0
Sodium carbonate 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.4 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.3
Pineapples, tinned 1.9 1.6 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.2
Cotton, raw 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.1
Wool, raw 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.7
Cashew nuts 0.6 1.2 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 2.2 1.0 1.2 0.5
Beans, peas and lentils 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.0
Oil—seeds, oilnuts and oil—kernels 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.4
Scrap metal 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
Butter and ghee 1.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.6
Maize, unmilled —— —— —— 2.6 8.3 4.4 —— —— —— 4.6
Other 8.5 9.1 8.0 10.5 11.4 12.8 14.0 15.1 14.9 19.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstracts, 1974, p. 63.
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TABLE 3
AFRICAN EXPORT ECONOMIES WHOLLY OR MAINLY DEPENDENT ON
A SINGLE COMMODITY, 1938—54 (TABLE SHOWS MILLIONS OF
NATIONAL CURRENCY AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS)
Country and Item 1938 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Egypt (UAR)
Total exports 28.6 173.0 200.6 142.8 135.9 136.7
Exports of raw cotton 21.2 149.8 164.1 126.4 116.4 113.1
Exports of raw cotton as
percentage of total exports 74.1 86.6 81.8 88.5 85.6 82.7
Ethiopia
Total exports —— —— 109.7 112.1 147.8 172.2
Exports of coffee —— —— 56.6 58.8 83.1 112.4
Exports of coffee as per
centage of total exports —— —— 51.5 52.4 56.2 65.2
Gambia
Total exports —— 2.2 3.0 3.7 2.6 2.9
Exports of groundnuts —— 2.1 2.7 3.6 2.5 2.2
Exports of groundnuts as
percentage of total exports —— 97.2 88.7 96.2 95.0 76.5
Gh an a
Total exports 11.2 76.2 90.0 84.3 88.0 113.3
Exports of cocoa 4.5 54.6 60.3 52.5 56.1 84.6
Exports of cocoa as per
centage of total exports 40.2 71.7 67.0 62.3 63.8 74.7
Sudan
Total exports 5.4 32.1 61.0 41.2 43.0 38.9
Exports of raw cotton 3.4 22.9 46.5 29.0 26.8 21.7
Exports of raw cotton as
percentage of total exports 63.7 71.3 76.2 70.4 62.3 55.7




UGANDA, DOMESTIC EXPORTS: PRINCIPAL
COMMODITIES BY VALUE, 1959—61 (L000)
Commodity 1958 1959 1960 1961
Coffee, not roasted 20,827 18,688 16,987 13,979
Tea 979 1,186 1,453 1,472
Animal feeding stuffs 1,104 1,654 1,677 1,425
Hinds and skins 764 941 1,146 816
Raw cotton 18,141 15,428 14,930 16,716
Copper and alloys (unwrought) 2,065 2,781 3,689 2,961
All others 1,528 1,413 1,676 1,826
Total 45,408 24,091 41,658 39,195
Source: Work for Progress: Uganda’s Second Five—Year Plan, 1966—1971,
Entebee, p. 1.
TABLE 5
NIGERIA, DOMESTIC EXPORTS: MAIN COMMODITIES
BY TONNAGE AND VALUE, 1956—58
Commodity Tonnage Value (L)
Palm kernels 433,000 19,616,000
Palm—oil 174,000 13,777,000
Groundnuts (including oil and cake) 507,000 30,267,000
Cocoa 113.000 25,605,000
Cotton lint 29,000 7,098,000
Cotton seed 42 .000 925,000
Rubber 40,000 7,024,000
Bananas 78,000 2,822,000
Source: Adapted from Economic Survey of Nigeria 1959, Lagos Government
Printer, 1959, p. 27.
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TABLE 6
SEMI—DIVERSIFIED EXPORT ECONOMIES OF AFRICA: SELECTED
PRINCIPAL EXPORTS 1938/1950—57 (TABLE SHOWS MILLIONS
OF NATIONAL CURRENCY AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS)
Value Percentage
Average Average










Wood and wood products
Diamonds

























































Total exports 5,639 129,102 100.0 100.0
Citrus fruits 140 8,310 2.5 5.6
Wine 2,756 57,687 48.9 39.7
Iron ore 317 9,987 5.6 6.8
Phosphates and chemical
fertilizers 53 2,129 0.9 1.5

















2.0 7.8 91.8 16.7
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~ For Liberia, 1937
b For Liberia, average for 1951—1956
C For Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, averages for 1950—1958
d For 1938, value in French metropolitan francs
e Including other precious stones
~ Figures prior to 1954 are totals for that were subsequently federated
Source: United Nations Economic Survey of Africa since 1950, p. 168.
TABLE 7
IVORY COAST: THE ECONOMIC DOMINANCE OF
ABIDJAN, 1974 (FIGURES DENOTE PERCENTAGES)
Category Abidjan Bouake Others Total
Production of value 64.7 8.8 26.5 100
Valued added* 70.0 17.0 13.0 100
Wages and salaries 65.2 10.5 24.3 100
Employment 52.6 11.9 35.5 100
*The figure for value added for Abidjan is an estimate for 1973, while
that for Bouake is an estimate for 1971.
Source: Adapted from Ivory Coast: The Challenge of Success. Report
of a mission sent to the Ivory Coast by the World Bank,
Baltimore, 1978, p. 233.
Table 8 indicates the foreign earnings percentage accrued from
twenty commodities from Africa between 1970 and 1975. Note that seven
of these commodities are the ones included in the eight core commodities
and two basic food grains suggested for Integrated Commodity Program by
UNCTAD (i.e. copper, coffee, cocoa, tea, rubger, sisal and rice). Note
that in 1970 the total export value of these twenty commodities comprised
—15—
TABLE 8
EXPORTS OF TWENTY COMMODITTIES FROM
DEVELOPING AFRICA*, 1970—75 (TOTAL VALUES
EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF U. S. DOLLARS)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Crude petroleum 3,925 4,828 6,006 8,788 22,600 19,300
Copper 1,473 1,069 1,155 1,680 2,290 1,250
Coffee 828 793 895 1,193 1,334 1,200
Cocoa 696 592 563 740 1,100 1,150
Crude phosphate 162 170 206 262 1,270 1,150
Cotton 780 848 851 1,039 1,240 1,000
Wood 256 265 340 647 654 560
Iron—ore 299 316 331 408 491 560
Sugar 153 174 214 288 532 480
Groundnuts and oil 230 175 228 248 250 270
Diamonds 270 236 252 295 321 260
Tobacco 82 102 119 154 188 230
Palm—oil and kernels 124 131 89 115 280 190
Citrus fruit 125 128 132 190 156 180
Wine 196 70 89 198 146 150
Tea 84 86 108 109 123 135
Rubber 85 73 63 108 158 100
Sisal 44 36 44 78 188 95
Olive—oil 23 51 124 85 206 90
Rice 92 68 61 75 112 80
Total 9,927 10,211 11,870 16,700 33,639 28,430
Total Domestic Exports 12,590 12,990 15,170 21,340 39,000 33,960
*Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,
Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, United
Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia, and the East African
Community.
Source: UNECA, Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa,
1976, p. 92.
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9,927 millions while the total domestic export value was 12,590 millions.
This means these twenty products alone comprised over seventy—five percent
of the total domestic export value. In 1975 while these twenty products
comprised 28,430 millions of earnings, the total domestic exports was
33,960 million. This means the percentage of these twenty products alone
was over eighty percent of the total domestic export.
Table 9 indicates the percentage of foreign earnings accrued by
different economic sectors in Nigeria. Note that in 1976, 1977 and
1978 the mineral products sector of Nigeria was responsible for 93.7,
92.8 and 89.1 percent of total export earnings respectively.
On top of all these, there is a debt burden that perpetuates the
economic gap. This debt has high interest rates. ‘In 1969, debt
service payments on both offi ci al and pri vate account by devel opi ng
countries amounted to about eleven billion dollars and gross spending to
these countries to about sixteen billion dollars. Therefore, the
reverse flow of debt service payments as a percentage of gross spending
averaged about seventy percent, with the ratio varying from one major
geographical region to another.’3
Recent facts also show an increasing trend in the debt service
payments of developing countries. Table 10 indicates both the total debt
and debt service payments of developing countries from 1975 up to 1981.
Note the increasing trend of the ratio of debt service payment to the
total debt. In 1975 the total debt was one hundred forty billion, while
3Angelos Angelopoulos, The Third World and the Rich Countries,
Prospect for the Year 2000, New York, 1972, p. 119.
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TABLE 9
NIGERIA: EXPORT OF MAJOR COMMODITIES
BY ECONOMIC SECTORS, 1976—78
Value (in N million) Percentage of
Total Export Value
Commodity 1976 1977 1978 1976 1977 1978
Major agricultural
including fresh products 274.1 375.1 412.8 4.1 3.9 6.8
Mineral products 6324.7 7079.2 5402.8 93.7 92.8 89.1
Manufactured and semi—
manufactured products 58.9 84.1 42.8 0.9 1.1 0.7
Other exports 86.0 82.7 193.7 1.3 1.1 3.2
Total domestic exports 6743.7 7621.7 6051.8 99.9 99.9 99.8
Re—exports 7.4 9.0 12.6 0.1 0.1 0.2
Total Exports 6751.1 7630.7 6064.4 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note that the figures for 1978 are estimates.
Source: Adapted from Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and
Statement of Accounts for the Year Ended 31 December, 1978.
the debt service was nineteen billion; thus a ratio of about 1:7, while
in 1981 the total debt was four hundred eighteen billion to eighty
billion debt service; that is a ratio of about 1:4. It is also clear
that there is an opportunity cost situation here: The ImDre foreign
exchange that must be used to repay loans, the less there is available




FOREIGN PUBLIC DEBT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(BILLION U. S. DOLLARS)
1975 1978 1979 1980(e) 1981(p)
Total 140 255 299 353 418
Debt Service 19 40 51 64 80
(e) = estimated
(p) = projected
Source: World Development, Vol. 9, No. 11/12, 1981, P. 1122.
In the-years between 1965—1967 a united nations survey indicated
that the relation between payments for investment income and net inflows
of long—term financial resources and official grants to the developing
nations resulted the changes shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE OF DEBT SERVICE
PAYMENTS TO GROSS LENDING, 1965—67
Group of Countries Percentage of Gross Lending
Developing countries (48, exclusive
of oil—exporting countries) 49.3
Latin America (20 countries) 104.9
Africa (13 countries) 57.0
Asia (15 countries) 25.2
Oil exporting countries (7 countries) 521.2
Source: Angelos Angelopoulos, The Third World and the Rich Countries,
prospects for the year 2000, New York, 1972, p. 121.
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Therefore according to the survey, Latin America transferred to
foreign creditors five percent more than it received form them, while the
seven oil—exporting countries paid out five times more than they received.
With this in mind it is appropriate to quote Gabriel Valdes’ , Ex—foreign
Minister of Chile, reasoning for Latin America’s continuing under—
development. “It is generally believed that our continent receives real
finanical aid. The data shows the opposite. We can affirm that Latin
America is making a contribution to financing the development of the
United States and other industrialized countries. Private investment
has meant and does mean for Latin America that the sums taken out of our
continent are several times higher than those that are invested. Our
potential capital declines. The benefits of invested captial grow
and multiply themselves enormously, though not in our countries, but
abroad. The so—called aid, with all its well—known conditions, means
markets and greater development for the developed countries, but has
not in fact managed to compensate for the money that leaves Latin
America in payment of external debt and as a result of the profits
generated by private direct investment. In one word we know that Latin
America gives more than it receives.”4
Therefore while the developed economies have been growing steadily
and enjoying a good standard of living, most of the developing nations
are characterized by stagnation, dependency, and subhuman conditions.
4james D. Cockraft, Andre Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson,
Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America’s Political Economy,
Garden City, New York, 1972, p. 1.
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This in itself has exacerbated the economic gap. “In 1978, some 140
developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin ~erica, and parts of Europe
and Oceania (with seventy—five percent of world’s population) accounted
for only twenty—one percent of the global world product. In contrast,
the thirty or so developed countries of North America, Europe, the
Soviet Union, Japan, Australia and New Zealand (with only twenty—five
percent of world’s population) accounted for seventy—nine percent of
global G.N.P. in 1978.”~ Table 12 indicates this development gap.
We have to bear in mind that G.N.P. does not necessarily mean the whole
country is better off. Although it is a good indicator of well being,
G.N.P. growth in many developing countries has generated increasing
amount of unemployment and underemployment. Moreover, growth G.N.P.
has been accompanied by growing inequality in the distribution of
income and even absolute impoverishment of certain sectors.
Even if measured by per captia income the gap between developed
and developing countries has widened considerably over the last two
decades. “Per capita incomes have risen in the developed countries
from $1,407 to $6,468, while those of the developing nations have
increased from $132 to $597”6
As mentioned above, there is a human cost that is attributable to
the poverty of developing nations. This high human cost not only
includes chronic disease, hunger, premature death and chronic nutritional
5The United States and World Development, Agenda, 1980, p. 146.
6The United States and World Development Agenda, 1980, p. 146.
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deficiency, but it also includes a degredation of human spirit which
lasts not for a few years, but generation after generation. Table 13
shows us the gap in the physical quality of life and G.N.P. by region.
It is my contention that this inequality could be narrowed through
integrated commodity program for trade which will bring about improvement
in gains from trade to developing nations and thereby help in their
efforts of developement. The next chapter looks specifically at the
role of trade to developing nations.
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TABLE 12
THE DEVELOPMENT GAP, BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES
Lower Upper
Low—Income Middle—Income Middle—Income High—Income Developing Developed
Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries
Mid—1979 Population (millions) 1,131.7 1,443.6 597.0 1,146.4 3,244.5 1,074.2
Average Per Capita G.N.P. (1979) $ 176 454 $1,347 $6,300 $597 $6,468
Average PQLI1 41 64 69 93 57 94
Average Birth Rate (per 1,000) 38 27 35 16 32 15
Average Death Rate (per 1,000) 16 10 9 9 12 9
Average Life Expectancy (years) 49 60 61 72 56 72
Average Infant Morality Rate
(per 1,000 live births) 132 75 85 21 96 18
Average Literacy Rate 35% 56% 71% 97% 52% 99%
Average Per Capita Education
Expenditures $4 $12 $41 $280 $18 $286
Average Per Capita Military
Expenditures $5 $28 $52 $297 $29 $300
‘Each country’s PQLI (Physical Quality of Life Index) is based on an average of life expectancy at age one,
infant mortality, and literacy.
Source: The United States and World Development Agenda, 1980, p. 147.
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TABLE 13
POPULATION, G.N.P., AND PQLI, BY REGION, 1978
Average
Per Capita
Population1 G.N.P.1 G.N.P.2 PQLI2’3
(Percentages) (Percentages) ($)
Africa4 7.6 1.2 333 36
Asia5 48.8 8.8 374 58
Japan 2.7 9.5 7,330 97
Latin America6 7.7 4.9 1.329 72
Europe7 18.6 42.6 4,751 93
North America 5.8 26.6 9,649 95
Oceania 0.5 1.5 6,031 87
OPEC 7.5 4.3 1,194 48
Other8 0.8 0.6 1.794 64
Total 100.0 100.0 2,060 66
Developed Countries 25.3 78.5 6,468 94
Developing Countries 74.7 21.5 597 57
11n 1978, world population was 4.2 billion; world G.N.P. was $8.8 trillion.
2All averages are weighted by mid—1979 populations of the countries
included.
3Each country’s Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) is based on an
average of life expectancy at age one, infant mortality and literacy.
4Does not include South Africa and the OPEC countries of Algeria, Gabon,
Libya, and Nigeria.
5lncludes the People’s Rep. of China. Does not include Israel, Japan,
and the OPEC countries of Indonesia, tran, Iraq, Kuwait, Ouatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
6Excludes the OPEC countries of Ecaudor and Venezuela.
7lncludes Eastern European countries and the U.S.S.R.
8lsrael and South Africa.
Source: ODC table based on population and G.N.P. data from World Bank
Atlas, 1979, and per captia G.N.P. and PQLI data from this
volume. Annex A, Table A—4.
CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TO DEVELOPING NATIONS
First, there is a theory of mutually beneficial trade which has its
origin in the theory of comparative advantage. Explanation of this
theory can be understood with a presentation of a production possibility
curve. A production possibility curve shows the way one good can be
given up for the production of another by reshuffling resources. For
example, in Figure 2, AB is the production possibility curve. It
represents the maximum production of an economy. At the curve, the inputs
are allocated between the two goods so that there is no reallocation that
would increase the output of one good without reducing the output of the
other. It is assumed that a country only produces good A and B. It is
also assumed that a country has fixed supplies of all inputs and it uses
these supplies such as capital, management, labor and land efficiently.
If a country produces at a point below the curve, it has to reshuffle
its resources so as to obtain the optimum production possible (on the
production possibility curve). The production curve is also the ratio
of the price of good A and B.
Now, if we suppose that this country has a comparative advantage in
the production (price) of good A than another country that also produces
only good A and B and also faces its own production possibility curve,
as is depicted in Figure 3, the first country is able to gain from mutual
trade and consume a combination of A and B that lies beyond its production
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What happens is that the first country is giving up less of A for
B due to international trade. Now the rate of exchange of one unit
of A is one unit of B. The line AC is the terms on which the country
can trade on the international market.
Therefore, specialization in production of the good in which the
economy has a comparative advantage and trading for the other good on
the international market provide another means by which a country may
increase the availability of goods for its people.
However, international price levels tend to turn against the primary
commodities that the developing countries tend to export and in favor of
manufactured goods they tend to import. Table 14 indicates the secular
trends in deflated prices for UNCTAD core commodities, UNCTAD other








0 = higher combination of A and B
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SECULAR TRENDS IN DEFLATED PRICES FOR UNCTAD CORE
COMMODITIES, UNCTAD OTHER COMMODITIES, AND ADDITIONAL




















































price indices in United Nations (7) and OECD
§ Not significantly different form zero at standard five percent level.
Source: Jere R. Behrman, Development, the International Economic Order,
and Commodity Agreements, California, 1978, p. 58.
The developing countries position on commodities is associated with



















and development. Not only have the terms of trade shifted against
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commodities and in favor of manufactures, but also this trend can be
expected to continue. To the extent that this is the case, earnings
from the export of commodities will be insufficient to pay for the
imports required for development. The seriousness of the shortage of
earnings from producers can be shown by comparing Table 14 with Table 15.
The data presented in Table 15 indicate that most developing
countries derive the bulk of their export earnings from only a few
commodities. More than half of the developing countries derive at
least fifty percent of their export earnings from three or fewer
commodities, and only eighteen of the 114 developing countries obtain
less than ten percent of their export earnings from these commodities.
Table 16 shows the distribution of developing countries’ export
earnings as a percent of gross domestic product. Export earnings were
at least forty percent of gross domestic product for twenty—five of
the developing countries in 1972.
With the declining price of commodities in mind the comparison of
variations in price of fifteen primary commodities and several
manufactured goods also shows that primary commodity prices are much
less stable then the prices of manufactured goods as is confi rmed by
the coefficients of variation. Table 17 shows such comparison. For
the 1951—1975 period, the coefficients of variation for the commodity
prices (except for bananas, wheat and rice) were at least twice those
of manufactured goods.
“Even if oil is left out of the reckoning about two—thirds of the
developing countries’ total export earnings accrued from sales of
commodities. If oil is included, the proportion exceeds eighty percent.
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TABLE 15
PERCENT OF THE LDCS EXPORT EARNINGS DERIVED
FROM COMMODITIES, EXCEPT PETROLEUM
Largest Largest Three All Commodity
Percent of Commodity Export Commodity Exports Exports
Export Earnings
Number Cumulative Number Cumulative Number Cumulative
90—100 1 1 6 6 12 12
80—90 4 5 5 11 12 24
70— 80 4 9 6 17 15 39
60 — 70 6 15 11 28 13 52
50 — 60 12 27 15 43 12 64
40— 50 7 34 10 53 9 73
30 — 40 12 46 11 64 9 82
20 — 30 18 64 11 75 9 91
10— 20 15 79 7 82 5 96
0 — 10 35 114 32 114 18 114
Source: Compiled from data in International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Commodity Trade and Price Trends (1975).
These figures relate to the developing countries taken as a whole.
For a large number of individual developing countries, the dependence
on commodity exports is considerably greater. Furtherrrore, many of
the commodities exported chiefly by the developed countries have, by
and large, enjoyed stronger market conditions than those emanating
from the developing countries——reflecting the greater capacity of the
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TABLE 16
DISTRIBUTION OF THE LCDS’ EXPORT EARNINGS AS
A PERCENT OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1972
Export Earnings as
a Percent of GDP Number of LDCs Cumulative
100 3 3
80—100 4 7





Note: In seveal cases, it was necessary to use the average value of
exports for 1971—1972.
Sources: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Commodity Trade and Price Trends (1975); Europa Publishing
Company, Europa Yearbook (1975); and International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics (1974).
former to protect and otherwise regulate their internal and external
trade in those products. The developing countries on the other hand,
have not possessed a similar capacity and the products for which they
are the primary source have consequently not enjoyed similar advantages.”
7New Directions and New Structures for Trade and Development. Report
by the Secretary—General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development to UNCTAD, IV, 1976, p. 18.
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TABLE 17
VARIATION IN COMMODITY PRICES, 1951—1975
High Low Coefficient
Commodity (1975 100) of Variation
Cocoa 190.7 54.9 0.29
Coffee 288.2 100.0 .25
Tea 274.2 100.0 .26
Sugar 128.7 16.9 .61
Cotton 227.1 100.0 .22
Jutea 166.7 77.4 .21
Sisalb 144.5 41.4 .38
Rubber 531.6 100.0 .38
Copper 285.3 100.0 .33
Tin 129.0 67.9 .20
Bananas 214.1 100.0 .18
Beefc 129.4 26.8 .55
Rice 153.5 69.2 .21
Wheat 125.6 72.9 .14
Wool 324.7 100.0 .29
Electrical Machinery
and Equipment 127.0 100.0 .06
Mechanical Power and
Transmission Equipment 103.0 74.3 .10
New Carsd 153.2 100.0 .13
Women’s and Girls’
Apparel 140.8 100.0 .08
Sources: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Commodity Trade and Price Trends (1975); Untied Nations, Food
and Agriculture Organization, Trade Yearbook (1974); United
Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, March, 1976; U. S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Prices
and Price Indices (various issues); Bureau of Labor Statistics
Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes (various issues).
Note: Commodity prices were deflated by the U. N. world price index for
all commodities. The prices of electrical machinery and equipment
and mechanical power and transmission equipment were deflated by
the U. S. wholesale price index of durable manufactures. The
price of new cars and women’s and girls’ apparel were deflated by
the U. S. consumer price index.
aSeries begins with 1954.
bSeries begins with 1955.
C5eries ends with 1974.
dSerjes begins with 1953.
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The proposal of integrated commodity program implies a disagreement
with the theory of comparative advantage and agrees nore with another
theory of international trade called Structurally Biased Gains from
Trade. This research of the Integrated Commodity Program indicates that
Structurally Biased Gains theory seems to capture the essence of the
lower prices of natural resources as compared to prices of finished and
capital goods.
The Structurally Biased Gains from Trade states that the way the
present international world market is structured, it biases the gains
from trade in favour of the rich, technologically advanced and
industrialized economies and against the poor, low technology agricultural
economies. It does so through the following mechanism.
First, because of the slow growth in demand for primary commodities,
only a declining proportion of the labor force in the developing countries
can be absorbed in their production. Improvements in the productivity
of primary activities cause an even further drop in that proportion.
Thus, the labor force has to be shifted to industrial production, but
this takes a very long time and in the meantime, the surplus labor
exerts a downward pressure on the real level of wages in the developing
countries. Higher productivity in the primary export industries,
therefore, is reflected in lower prices rather than in higher wages.
Thus, the fruits of technical advance in the developing countries are
passed on to the industrial countries. In the latter, on the other
hand, the relative shortage of labor and strong labor unions keep wages
rising in step with rising productivity, preventing any fall in prices.
Hence, a persistent deterioration of the terms of trade of the developing
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countries is the result of fundamental structural differences between
the industrial centers and the peripheral , developing countries.
Second, the income elasticities for poor economies’ export are
consistently smaller than for their imports. This means when world
income increases there is a lower responsiveness in demand for primary
products as opposed to manufactured ones. Therefore poor economies
cannot grow at the same rate as developed economies without running
into foreign exchange crises at fixed exchange rates.
Third, the developed countries’ demand for raw materials is under—
minded by technical progress, which develops substitutes for the raw
materials previously imported from primary producers. Thus the relative
rate of growth of demand for imported raw cotton, natural rubber and
cane sugar, for example goes down as world economic activity grows.
Moreover, in many important respects the commodity sectors of the
developing countries stand in need of major restructuring. The existing
structures are still largely an imposition from the past, when the
metropolitan powers “opened up” the countries of the periphery for the
production of the raw materials and other primary products required by
their expanding economies. Although, following independence, the new
nations introduced changes, many characteristics of the old system
remain unchanged. “...In varying degrees the methods of marketing and
distribution, the directions of trade, the control over transportation
and other supporting activities, the involvement in processing, the
system and level of renumeration, and even the patterns of ownership
and the role played by foreign enterprises, continue to reinforce and
perpetuate the essential features of the old (colonial) relationships.
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These relationships need to be changed in many ways, for they are
inconsistent with the developing countries’ present day requirements
for modernization and transformation and greater control over their
destinies. “8
It is true that the developing countries that export oil have seen
a dramatic improvement in their terms of trade and a consequent increase
in the financial resource available to them. Yet even for them, the
change in fortunes must be set in the perspective of their need for the
transformation and improvement of their own societies, of the rising
prices they have to pay for imports, and of the quality of the investment
outlets available to them to offset the depletion of their natural
resources.
The situation for many of the non—oil exporting countries, however,
is catostrophic. They are faced with a combination of rising prices
for their commodity exports, sparked off by the recession in the
industrialized world. These countries are experiencing payments problems
of such huge dimension as to threaten the very foundation of their
societies. “The overall payments deficit of the non—oil exporting
developing countries with the rest of the world was of the order of
twelve billion dollars in 1973. Since then it escalated to about
forty—five billion in 1975, and can be expected to remain in the region
of thirty—five billion to forty billion in the years immediately ahead.
These deficits are not based on levels of imports that allow high rates
8New Directions and New Structures for Trade and Development. Report
by the Secretary—General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development to UNCTAD, IV, 1976, p. 19.
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of economic growth. Rather, they reflect import requirements that are
vital for a modest and minimal rate of expansion.”9
Moreover, even though the international market mechanism works,
though not too perfectly, once there are major disparities in income
distribution between countries, the market mechanism ceases to function
either efficiently or equitably, since it is weighted heavily in favor
of the purchasing power in the hands of the rich. Those who have the
money can make the market bend to their own will. When we start from a
position of gross inequalities, the international market mechanism
mocks poverty, or simply ignores it, since the poor hardly have any
purchasing power to influence market decisions.
These several limitations characterize the role of international
trade to the developing countries. Therefore there needs to be a
basic change in the present international trade practices. One of the
most important aspect of UNCTAD’s call for a new international economic
order is the proposal for the restructuring of world commodity trade.
At the heart of this proposal is the integrated commodity program
designed to improve the developing countries’ terms of trade and thereby
bring about increased revenue necessary for development. The next
chapter explains the theoretical advantages of such integrated commodity
programs.
9New Directions and New Structures for Trade and Development. Report
by the Secretary—General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development to UNCTAD, IV, 1976, p. 12.
CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL ADVANTAGES OF INTEGRATED COMMODITY PROGRAMS
Before explaining the empirical works of integrated commodity
program, it helps to understand its theoretical advantages and some
assumptions. Before explaining these advantages and assumptions of
commodity agreements a brief historical account of the developing
nation’s attempt to improve their terms of trade is necessary. From
the past chapters the author has established the reason that the
developing countries did not share adequately in the prosperity of the
developed countries at a time of rapid economic expansion in the
developed nations. This is traced to some basic weaknesses in the
mechanism that links the international economic system. The proposals
for a new economic order reflect changes of an unprecedented magnitude
in the purposes, mechanisms, and structures of the existing international
economic system.
The developing countries have tried to convince the developed
nations to make the international economic system ntre responsive to
their needs. However, these efforts have met with little support. The
gain of independence in the 1960’s, instead of bringing about economic
independence, most of the new nations were still heavily dependent
upon the developed nations for the export of their raw materials and
import of manufactured goods——thus, twin dependency.
The “Group of 77”, presently comprising 130 or more states of the
south, came into being within the framework of UNCTAD I in 1964. The
group has emerged as a cohesive block in international forums with some
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success in drawing world attention to their economic problems. Since
its formation, the group has campaigned relentlessly for a “new order”
both within the United Nations system and other international
organizations. However, it was in 1974 that the “Groups of 77” launched
an official campaign for new international economic order.
This call for a new international economic order by the south is
hoped to be a comprehensive drive to rectify the present imbalance that
exist among states in the present international economic system. It
aims at redistributing the world’s economic resources and the bringing
about of equity in the international economic system. It also hoped
that this will abolish third world poverty, dependency, and economic
injustice which seems to be the hallmarks of the present economic order.
In 1964 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development)
was created within the United Nations with an explicit mandate to focus
on the problems of developing world. However, it was in 1976 at UNCTAD
IV, Nairobi Meeting that the proposal was promoted for an integrated
commodity program financed by a common fund. The broad objectives of
this’ proposal is to improve the terms of trade of developing countries,
and to ensure an adequate rate of growth in the purchasing power of
their aggregate earnings from their exports of primary commodities,
while minimizing short term fluctuations in those earnings. The
proposal recommends focus on seventeen commodities, which cover about
three—quarters of the non—petroleum commodity trade of the developing
countries. These include ten “core” commodities (cocoa, coffee, copper,
sugar, cotton, jute, rubber, sisal , tea and tin) and seven others
(bananas, bauxite, beef and veal, iron ore, rice, wheat, and wool.
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This integrated programme for commodities comprises five basic
elements. These are: (1) The establishment of internationally—owned
stocks covering a wide range of commodities; (2) the establishment of
a common financing fund that will make resources avialable for the
acquisition of stocks; (3) the institution, in circumstances which
justify it, of a system of medium—term to long—term commitments to
purchase and sell commodities at agreed prices; (4) the institution
of more adequate measures than are at present available to provide
compensatory financing to producers to cover shortfalls in export
earnings; and (5) the initiation of an extensive programme of measures
to further the processing of commodities by the producing countries
themsel yes.
The major objective of this commodity agreement is price
stabilization. This study attempts to demonstrate the advantages of
price stabilization through the integrated commodity program. Benefits
or advantages to producers are measured by the extra revenues they
receive, while advantages to consumers are measured by the additional
consumer surplus they receive. Consumer surplus means the sum, for all
units of a commodity of the difference between what consumers will be
willing to pay for each unit and what they have to pay. For example,
in Figure 5 consumers are willing to pay a price of P3 for the first
unit of Q. To get the second unit they are willing to pay a price
slightly less than P3. To buy Q2 unit they are willing to pay P2. That
is if the price is P2 they are willing to pay P2 for each unit of Q. Now
to measure their consumer surplus we subtract P2 from what consumers
will be willing to pay for each unit of Q2~ In other words, this is the
—39—
difference between the demand curve and the horizontal price line at
~ which is the area of the triangle A. Using the same principle, the
consumer surplus is A + B + C at a market price of P0.
Buffer stocks operate through buying and selling as necessary to
held prices within established bonds. In this case the buffer stock
stabilzes prices by purchasing the commodity if the price would fall
from P0, and selling it if otherwise the price would rise above P0.
There is nothing new about the idea of creating international stocks
to intervene in world commodity markets. This possibility was considered
at the versailles conference in 1919. No actions on commodities were
adopted at the time, and there seems to have been virtually no multi
lateral involvement by developing countries in the commodity markets
during the 1920’s. Several commodity agreements were, however, formed
during the 1930’s and commodity problems were a fairly active area of
governmental concern.
In Figure 5 the initial supply curve is assumed to cross the demand
curve 001 at price of P0 and quantity Q0. If the supply curve shifts out
to Qi. the buffer stock purchases Qi — Q0 units maintaining the price
P0 instead of P1. Now the producer’s revenue gain through maintaining
the price at P0 is D E F G. The consumer’s surplus due to paying a
higher price of P0 other than P1 that would have been the market price is
negative, that is — 0, — E, — F. The cost to the buffer stock of
purchasing Qi — Q0 units is — G — F — I. The net benefit that is obtained
by adding consumer’s surplus, producer’s surplus and the cost to the
buffer stock is — F, — I.
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Now when the supply curve shifts to Q2’ Qo — Q2 units are sold by
the buffer stock. The producer’s revenue gain is — B since they would
loose B amount if there was no price stabilization. The benefits to
consumers is B + C due to lower price. The gain to the buffer stock due
to sale Q0 — Q2 at P0 price is H + E. The total benefit now is C + E + H.
Now if we add the total benefit of consumers and producers due to
a buffer stock operation when the supply shift to Qi and Q2 from Q0 is
C + E + H — F — I. This means there is overall benefit for both
consumers and producers since C + E + H is greater than F + I. The
overall cost to the buffer stock is — G — F — I + H + E. It is zero
since the amount G, F, I and H and E are assumed to be the same.
FIGURE 5
GAINS AND LOSSES FROM PRICE STABILIZATION
(SHIFTS IN INELASTIC SUPPLY CURVE ONLY)
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From this we can conclude that there is overall benefit to both
producers and consumers as a result of price stabilization which is
the core of the integrated commodity program.
Implicit in this, however, are certain assumptions on the elasticity
of demand for the core commodities. It could be argued that if demand
elasticities are high costs could significantly outweigh benefits to the
developing nations. However, as is indiated in Table 17, recent
studies have shown that demand elasticitie.s for many of the
core commodities are low. We can note from the table that demand
elasticities with respect to price are generally low, less than unity.
Also, the logged response to price varies with a typical mean log period
of one to three years.
Now, let us deal with an impact on revenues due to price stabilization
when a shift in demand and supply curves occur. The author will deal
with three cases. First, when there is a shift in supply. Second,
when there is a shift in demand. And third, when there is a shift in
supply while both the demand and supply curves are inelastic.
Figure 6 demonstrates a case of a shift in supply when both supply
and demand curves are elastic. Initially price is stabilized at the
intersection of demand curve BB1 and supply curve AA1 with a price of
P0. When supply curve shifts upward to CC1, with price stabilization
at P0, producer’s revenue is P0 X Q1 or 5.5 x 4.2. When supply curve
shifts downward to EE1, their revenue is 5.5 x 8.3. Thus a total revenue
of 68.75 Without price stabilization, when supply shifts upward to
CC1 producer’s revenue is 6.7 X 5.2. When supply shifts downward to
EE1, producer’s revenue is 4.1 x7.3. Thus a total revenue of 64.77.
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TABLE 18




.2 2.1 —— Adams (1974)
aRegi ons: DC—developed countries; LDC—less devel oped countries; S—central ly
planned countries.
Source: F. Gerald Adams, Jere R. Behram, Econometric Modeling of World
Commodity Policy,” Cambridge, 1976, p. 61.
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DC —0.33 1.3 0 —— Adams—Behrman(1976)
LDC —0.13 3.1 1.38 3.1 Adams—Behrman(1976)
S —0.63 1.6 1.18 0
DC —0.24 1.0 0.2 0 Adams—Behrman(1976)
LDC —0.31 1.5 0.4 1.0
S —1.25 0.5 1.45 0
DC —0.03 3.8 0.30 0.3 Adams—Behrman (1976)
LDC —0.05 0.6 0.78 0.1
S —0.47 5.2 0.36 2.5
DC —0.52 0 0.42 0 Adams—Behrman (1976)
LDC —0.51 1.5 0.03 0
S 0.0 —— 0.16 0
DC —0.8 2.2 2.1 0 Adams—Behrman (1976)
LDC —0.02 1.3 0 0
S 0.0 —— —— ——
DC —0.9 1 —— —— Behrman (1975)
DC —0.27 3.8 1.81 0 Adams—Behrman (1976)
LDC —0.16 0.6 1.05 0
S —0.20 5.2 2.05 0
DC —0.44 1.9 1.15 0.1 Adams—Behrman (1976)
LDC —0.18 2.8 0.47 0
S —0.14 0.3 0.0 ——
U.S. —0.82 4.8 0.7 4.8 Fisher (1972)
Europe —0.19 2.1 0.99 2.1 Fisher (1972)
Japan —0.12 0 0.60 0 Fisher (1972)
—0.47 1.0 1.85 0 Behrman (1975)
1.17 0 1.83 1.0 Behrman (1975)
—0.01 1.2 1.28










Therefore we can conclude that price stabilization, when their is a
shift in supply benefits producers.
FIGURE 6
IMPACT ON REVENUES OF SHIFT SUPPLY ONLY WITH AND











Figure 7 demonstrates a shift in demand curve when both supply and
demand curves are elastic. With price stabilization, whether the demand
curve is shifted up or down, producers receive P0 x Q0, that is 5 x 8.4
or 42. Twice this amount for both upward and downward shifts is
42 x 2 84. Without price stabilization, when demand shifts upward







to FF1, producer’s revenue is 4 x 7.2 = 28.8. Thus producer’s revenue
is 28.8+ 60 = 88.8. In this case, however, price stabilization has to
be taken for its own merit only since it decreases producer’s revenue.
FIGURE 7
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Figure 8 shows a shift in supply curve when both supply and demand
curves are inelastic. With price stabilization at P0 when supply
curves shifts to the right, producer’s revenue is 5.7 x 7 = 39.9. When
supply curve shifts to the left, producer’s revenue is 5.7 x 4 = 22.8.
A total revenue of 62.7. Without price stabilization when supply curve
shift’s to the right, producer’s revenue is 7 x 2.8 19.6. When supply
curve shifts to the left, producer’s revenue is 4 x 9 = 36. A total of
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36 + 19.6 ~ 55.6. Therefore in the case of inelastic supply and demand
curves a shift in supply curve benefits producer’s revenues due to price
stabilization and increased revenue.
FIGURE 8
SHIFT IN SUPPLY ONLY (INELASTIC CURVE)
Even though case number two shows that price stabilization decreases
producer’s revenues while case number one and three show price stabili.
zation increases producer’s revenues, in general , price stabilization
clearly implies more of producer’s revenue stabilization than if there
were no price stabilization.
From these cases we can make two conclusion: (1) If producing
countries would like an increase of revenues more than revenue stabili-.








that is when there is a shift in supply on both elastic and inelastic
supply and demand curves; and (2) if the producing countries are more
interested in revenue stabilization because of some disruptive effects
on their economies than an increase in their revenue, then the
proposal of integrated commodity program makes sense in the case of
number two, when there is a shift in demand.
Now, let us present a hypothetical situation, assuming that the
quantity demanded is independent of price but varies with the business
cycle, to compare the expenditure of buyers. Table 18 shows such
situation. It is assumed that supply is stable and has an elasticity
of 0.3. Quantity demanded is independent of price but varies with
business cycle from low eighty to normal 100 to high 120. The second set
of figures point to the operation of buffer stock due to price stabili
zation. The net result shows that buyer’s expenditures is lessened.
In this situation at any given price, more is purchased when the level
of demand is high then when it is low, it seems likely that the gains
from holding price down in period of high demand exceed the costs
to buyers when price is supported in a period of low demand. This
theoretical conclusion is also supported by David L. McNicol in his
book Commodity Agreements and Price Stabilization.
Buffer stock operation is used to stabilize prices in order to
increase developing countries export earnings. However, there are
other mechanisms suggested to produce the same result. These include
compensatory financing to export earnings when they are below average
and repayment when they are above average, controls on supply, foreign
aid and borrowing from international agencies and private sources.
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TABLE 19
EXAMPLE OF THE EFFECTS OF PRICE STABILIZATION ON BUYERS’
EXPENDITURES WHEN SUPPLY IS STABLE AND DEMAND VARIES
Without Price Stabilization
Supply Demand Price Expenditure
120 120 1.67 200.00
100 100 1 .00 100.00





Supply and Sales C—) Demand Price Expenditure
100 20 120 1.00 120.00
100 0 100 1.00 100.00
100 — 20 80 1.00 80.00
300.00
Source: David L. McNicol, Commodity Agreement and Price Stabilization:
A Policy Analysis, Lexington, 1978, p. 23.
In so far as relations with developed and developing countries were
concerned, the two decades after World War II were the era of foreign
aid. The Marshall Plan, which was inaugrated in 1947, was of unprece
dented size and scope, and because it was highly successful , it became
a model. However, the Marshall Plan was aimed solely at Europe. After
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the Marshall Plan a variety of bilateral programs for the developing
countries were developed, and later the emphasis begin to shift toward
multilateral aid programs. It is generally conceded that the current
spending on development assistance is much less than would be required
to provide rapid economic growth in the developing countries. ‘Development
assistance programs have not succeeded in producing self—sustaining growth
in less developed coutries, primarily because of the structure of existing
programs, too little funding, and limitations on injections of capital as
a stimulus to development.”10 As the then Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger said it in 1975, “We have learned from experience that the
methods of development assistance of the 1950’s and 60’s are no longer
adequate....Realistically, we cannot expect the level (of development
assistance) to increase significantly over the coming years. To put it
frankly, the political climate for bilateral aid has deteriorated.’1’
As far as the comparison between compensatory financing, pure buffer
stock, and controls on supply is concerned, David L. McNicol, a former
senior staff on the President’s Council of Economic Advisors, has come
up with the conclusion summarized in Table 20. As we note from the
table, price stabilization through operation of a buffer stock not only
results in a reduction of price fluctuation and increase in export
earnings, but also the net direct benefits to suppliers and buyers are
positive as compared to compensatory financing and controls on supply.
10New Directions and New Structures for Trade and Development.
Report by the Secretary—General of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development to UNCTAD, IV, 1976, p. 4.
11Henry Kissinger, “Global Consensus and Economic Development,”
U. S. Department of State Bulletin 73 (September 22, 1975), pp. 427—430.
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TABLE 20
MAJOR DIRECT EFFECTS, EXCEPT CAPITAL COSTS, ON BUYERS AND SUPPLIERS
OF COMPENSATORY FINANCING, BUFFER STOCKS, AND CONTROLS ON SUPPLY
Net Direct
Direct Benefits and Costs to Suppliers Direct Benefits and Costs to Buyers Benefits to
Net Net Suppliers
Mechanism Benefits Costs Benefits Benefits Costs Benefits and Buyers
Compensatory Transfer when Repayment
financing export earn— when export 0 0 0 0 0
ings are below earnings are
average above average
Pure Increased Reduced Lower price Higher
buffer revenue when revenue when when sales price
stock purchases are sales are made + are made when pur— ± +
made to sup— to reduce chases are
port price price made
Controls Increased Higer
on revenue and price when
supply profit when 0 + 0 supply is —— ——
supply is restricted
restricted
Source: David L. McNicol, Commodity Agreements and Price Stabilization, Lexington, Massachusetts:
Lexington Books; Toronto: D. C. Heath and Company, 1978, p. 34.
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The effect of price stabilization on the export earnings of
commodities to the developing countries is of paramount importance.
The amount of foreign aid or other mechanisms of compensation are of
less importance to the developing nations as compared to the buffer
stock price stabilization. The significance of the heavy dependence
of the developing countries on the export of commodities should not
be missed. The prosperity of this sector of their economies is, rr~re
often the key determinant of their economic fortunes. It is a major
element in the health of their external payments position; in the level
of their external indebtedness , i.n the strenght of their domestic
budget and in the success of their efforts at saving and investment.
For all these reasons it is the major element that governs their ability
to cope with their social problems and to attain their national goals.
Any persistent weakness in this sector must handicap their efforts at
devel oment.
“With a few exceptions, the external resources obtained through
foreign aid are but a small fraction of the external resources earned
through the export of commodities. Any contraction in commodity earnings
offsets or reduces the beneficial impact of aid itself and impedes the
attainment of whatever develoment objectives that aid was intended to
support. A Policy for development cooperation which includes aid as a
major instrument, but which fails to recognize the pivotal importance of
the commodity sector for developing countries can only be self—defeating.”12
‘2New Directions and New Structures for Trade and Development.
Report by the Secretary—General of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development to UNCTAD, IV, 1976, pp. 18—19.
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From a political point of view, the advantages that the third world
countries accrue through such an integrated cc4llmodity program is also
significant in that it stops the frustrations of the third world countries
from erupting into social unrest which will have its repercussions for
the rest of the international community. The avoidance of tension in
the third world will be an increasingly important element in global
peace in the period ahead. It is inconceivable that the developed
countries can continue on a smooth and even course of growth and rising
proserity within a global framework in which the vast mass of people,
inhabiting the greater part of the planet, continues to remain in a
state of unrest. This in the last analysis, is the stake of the
developed countries in the successful resolution of the development
problem. Their response to third world demands cannot be based on a
narrow reckoning of immediate costs and benefits, or resources gained
and forgone. It needs to be set in the wider perspective of the
evolving pattern of global relationships——political as well as social.
The next chapter looks at the empirical works of integrated
commodity program.
CHAPTER IV
DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION OF EMPIRICAL
WORKS OF INTEGRATED COMMODITY PROGRAM
The last chapter analyzed what would happen if price stabilization
were implemented through integrated commodity program using some basic
economic theories. In this chapter the author will analyze what would
happen if price stabilization were implemented through integrated
commdity program by description of empirical work using econometric
technique. Therefore, it is important to explain the econometric
technique briefly.
In a nutshell, econometrics is the use of economic theory, mathe
matics, and statistics to obtain quantitative values of the parameters
that appear in an economic theory or a model. In this case the model is
the operation of international markets. In international markets there
are both suppliers and demanders of commodities. Suppliers depend on
the basis of the product prices they expect to prevail at the end of a
production process, the prices of the inputs of these products, and
the available production technology. Demanders depend on the basis of
their income, and the price of the commodity relative to other commodity
prices. This demand is for current use. There is also a demand for
inventories to insure inputs for normal operations, precautionary
demands and speculative demands related to expectations about future
price movements. This demand for inventories depends on current and
expected prices of the particular commodity. The demand for current
use plus inventory demand make up total demand. The model , therefore,
comprises four endogenous variables, that is, (1) production or supply,
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(2) demand for current use, (3) demand for inventory change. In equili
brium there is a specific price corresponding to a specific quantity.
At any higher price total , supply exceeds total demand and therefore
price tends to fall. Conversely, at any lower price total , demand
exceeds total supply and therefore price tends to rise.
Now that the relationship of different variables in this model has
been specified, the next step is to estimate the numerical value of the
parameters in these equations using statistical data obtained by ordinary
least square regression. In effect, these numerical values of parameters
for this case are price elasticities of supply and price and income
elasticities of demand,. After we obtain these estimates, we turn to
the major purpose of simulation of the model to find the results of
stabilization on commodity prices.
The first empirical work that the author will describe is that of
Jere R. Behman. Behrman simulated the international market to find the
effect of price stabilization for eight of the UNCTAD core commodities:
coffee, cocoa, tea, rubber, jute, sisal , copper, tin and two major food
grain——wheat and rice for the 1963—1972 decade within a fifteen percent
band of long—run secular trends. This means that the buffer stock
which is assumed to operate with sufficient financial reserves and
sufficient commodity reserves will buy a commodity if the price would
fall more than fifteen percent from the long—run secular trend and sell
if price would rise more than fifteen percent from the long—run secular
trend. The long—run secular trend he used are for 1950—1974. The
result of his simulations are summarized in Table 21.
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TABLE 21
SUMMARY OF SIMULATIONS OF BUFFER STOCK PRICE STABILIZATION SCHEMES
FOR EIGHT OF UNClAD CORE COMMODITIES AND TWO BASIC FOODGRAINS*
Mean Percentage
Changes as Compared Longest Continuous
to Base of S~mulation Period (in Years) of
Maximum Buffer Stock Activity
Value of Buffer
Quantity Producers stock (1000 Without Without
Commodity Price Supplied Revenues Metric tons)t Buying Selling
UNCTAD Core Commodities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coffee 4.7 06 5.2 21738t 5 7
Cocoa 10.0 12 11.1 546t 4 10
Tea 0.8 0.1 0.9 161 8 9
Rubber 9.2 0.0 9.2 3432 7 4
Jute 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 10 10
Sisal 8.9 0.5 10.2 232 5 5
Copper —0.9 0.0 —0.9 507 7 2
Tin —5.2 —1.0 —6.2 19 10 1
Core Commodities
(Sum or Average) 3.4 0.2 3.7 7.0 6.0
Basic Foodgrains
Wheat 0.1 0.1 0.2 1200 4 7
Rice 11.1 0.5 11.8 1600 3 3
Basic Foodgrains
(Sum or Average) 5.6 0.3 6.0 3.5 5.0
(Table 21 continues on next page.)
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TABLE 21 (CONTINuE)
Present Discounted Present Discounted Value oT
Value of Real Buffer Stock Activity,
Revenue: Stabili— Millions of 1975 Dollars
zation Base Simu— Ratio of Real Revenue at 5% Real Discount Rate
lation, Millions of Standard Deviation in
1975 Dollars at 5% Stabilization/Base Excluding Including
Commodity Real Discount Rate Simulation Final Stock Final Stock
UNCTAD Core Commodities (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coffee 2662 1.0 —4 324
Cocoa 1115 0.5 —126 351
Tea 114 0.9 —5 243
Rubber 2243 0.5 —879 777
Jute 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
Sisal —1 0.4 —53 —16
Copper —1339 0.8 —730 —454
Tin —656 0.9 —95 —95
Core Commodities
(Sum or Average) 4140 —1892 1130
Basic Foodgrains
Wheat 0.0 0.9 —2997 —1865
Rice 33440 1.0 —5054 —641
Basic Foodgrains
(Sum or Average) 33440 —8051 —2509
Source: Jere R. Behrman, Development, the International Economic Order, and Commodity Agreements,
California, 1978, p. 87.
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*Details of the underlying econometric models are given in Adams and
Behrman (1), Agosin (2), and Behrman (3). The buffer stock simulations
are identical to the base simulation except that the buffer stock
purchases or sells whatever is necessary to keep the deflated price
within the indicated band—width of the secular trend for 1950—1974.
The simulations are all for the 1963—1972 decade. The initial and
final stocks are valued at the 1962 and 1973 prices, respectively,
which overstates the present discounted values of buffer stock
operations. For discussion of other assumptions, procedures, and
biases, see Section 5.1 and 5.2.
tUnits are: thousands of 60 kg. bags for coffee; thousands of long tons
for cocoa; millions of pounds for jute.
Column 1 shows the percentage change of price through buffer stock
price stabilization to prices without stabilization, that is if the
simulation was done without trying the price around a + fifteen percent
of the secular trend. Note from this column that there is an increase
of price due to stabilization for all the commodities except copper and
tin. The price increase for cocoa is also significant. Column 2 and 3 show
the percentage change of quantity supplied and producer’s revenues
respectively. Column 8 shows the ratio of real revenue standard
deviation in stabilization to non—stabilization. The figures in this
column are low. This means the revenues are close, or there is a
revenue stabilization. Therefore, price stabilization results in
revenue stabilization. This means a lessening of the negative effects
of revenue fluctuation on the developing economies due to risk aversion
and costs that originate in uncertainty.
Column 7 shows the present discounted value of real revenue accrued
through price stabilization. The figures in this column indicate a
substantial amount of increase in revenues for most of these commodities.
Therefore, price stabilization does not only create revenue stabilization
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but a substantial increase in revenue. Column 7 also shows a negative
value for sisal, copper and tin. However, the addition to total revenue
outweighs by far the decrease in revenue in these three commodities.
It is suggested by the UNCTAD that since there is an overall increase
in revenue, the producers of commodities with lesser revenue could be
compensated.
In column 10 the present discounted value of buffer activity is
negative. However, the figure when compared to all of producers
combined revenue (column 7), the net gains by far outweighs the cost of
buffer stock operation. Price stabilization creates not only revenue
stabilization and an increase in revenue, but also reduces the negative
effects of synthetic substitution for natural products due to risk
aversion by the consumers of products such as rubber and cotton.
Now let us turn to the advantages of price stabilization to consumers.
When the buffer stock operates the price ceiling is set at fifteen percent
over the secular price trend. Without price stabilization it is possible
for the price to rise above the fifteen percent ceiling. “Over the
quarter century ending in 1975, the ten core commodities had averaged
price levels substantially above the secular trends a number of times.
In twenty—seven cases there were prices from fifteen to thirty percent
above the trend, in eighteen cases thirty to fifty percent above, in nine
cases fifty to one hundred percent above.” This means that price
stabilization reduces the inflationary pressure to consumers. The
1~Jere R. Behrrnan, Development, the International Economic Order,
and Commodity Agreements, California, 1978, p. 93.
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benefits could be qualified as follows. According to Popkin “a 14.5
percent increase in the price of nonfood and nonfuel raw materials causes
a one percent increase in the consumer price index of the United States.”2
Therefore the increase over the secular trend in the twenty—five years
before 1975 could account for about one or two percent of inflation in
the United States or other consuming countries.
Now let us look at the effect of stabilization not only by tying
of the secular price trend of fifteen percent ceiling and floor prices,
but also by addition of a two percent increase in the secular trend.
Again, according to Behrman’s simulation using the same technique, we
get the results as indicated in Table 22. Comparing columns 7 of this
table with the previous one gives us an excess of eighty—three billion
(total of column 7), which indicates a great deal of revenue increase
for producers. The equivalent constant annual value is eleven billion
instead of a little over a half billion in the previous table. The
average longest continuous period of buffer stock activity without
selling is 9.5 instead of 6.0 years.
Therefore price stabilization for the eight core commodities and
two foodgrains benefits producing countries by (1) revenue stabilization
and (2) increase in revenue. Price stabilization for these commodities
with an increase in the secular price trend benefits greatly the
producing countries while it causes a reduction in benefits to consuming
countries. Thus, from the point of view of producers and consumers
2j. Popkin, “Commodity Prices and the U. S. Price Panel,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1974, p. 256.
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revenue stabilization benefits both by reducing inflationary pressure
for the latter and revenue stabilization and increase for the former.
From the point of view of decreasing the gap of developed and developing
countries, price stabilization with an increase of secular price trend
is appropriate.
The integration of producers in their exports in itself has resulted
a stabilizing effect. Price variation in the products exported by any
one regional group do not move together precisely. For example, when
the price of cocoa is down, the price of groundnuts may be stable or
rising so that for the region as a whole export earnings are more stable.
Thus the common integrated market for exports could play a leading role
in mitigating the member’s vulnerability to external contingencies and
fluctuations. Likewise “Naya in his study of Asian countries’ exports,
concluded that enlarged trade through regional arrangements among these
countries could be strong stabilizing force....Erb and Schiavo—Campo
have found evidence that the European common market has exerted a
stabilizing force on the member countries’ exports.”3 Estimated effects
to buffer stock on the London metal exchange price of copper for the
years 1955—1973 has also shown a substantial degree of price stabilization
as in depicted in Figure 9.
David L. McNicol used a simulation analysis to find the expected
annual gains from price stabilization for thirteen commodities, ten of
3Guy F. Erb and Salvatore Shiavo—Campo, “Economic Instability,
Level of Development, and Economic Size of Less Developed Countries,”
Bulletin of the Oxford University, Institute of Economics and Statistics
31 (1969), 263—283.
TABLE 22
SUMMARY OF SIMULATIONS OF BUFFER STOCK PROGRAMS TO KEEP REAL DEFLATED PRICE WITHIN
15 PERCENT OF TREND——2 PERCENT GREATER THAN ACTUAL SECULAR TREND FOR A DECADE
Mean Percentage Present Present Discounted
Changes as Corn— Longest Continuous Discounted Value Values of Buffer
pared to Base of Period (in Years) of Additional Stock Activity, Mil—
Simulations Maximum of Buffer Stock Real Revenue lions of 1975 Dollars
Buffer Activity Due to Program at 5% Discount Rate
(1000 Billions of 1975
Metric Without Without U.S. Dollars) at Excluding Including
Commodity Price Quantity Value tons)t Buying Selling 5% Discount Rate Final Stock Final Stock
1. Core Commodities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Coffee 45.9 2.0 48.5 1O4822t 3 10 23 —394 11110
Cocoa 57.4 3.7 63.0 2552t 0 10 7 —1077 3110
Tea 47.5 7.2 59.0 2611 3 10 10 —1032 5695
Rubber 50.7 8.3 64.1 20526 0 10 22 —4748 11913
Jute 28.5 5.6 35.8 2893t 1 10 2 —640 —141
Sisal 67.4 8.1 82.9 1124 3 10 1 —332 —27
Copper 27.4 1.1 28.7 5578 1 6 20 —3732 9006
Tin 19.1 2.1 21.7 40 0 10 2 —73 238
8 Core Commodities
(Sum or Average) 43.0 4.8 50.5 14 9.5 87 —12028 40904
2. Basic Foodgrains
Wheat 50.3 10.9 67.3 604730 0 10 171 —147385 —55068
Rice 63.3 6.3 73.9 112280 3 10 258 —55941 —10063
Foodgrai ns
(Sum or Average) 56.8 8.6 70.6 1.5 10 429 —203326 —65131
Source: David L. McNicol, Commodity Agreements and Price Stabilization, Lexington, Mass., Toronto, 1978, p. 57.
tUnits are: thousands of 60 kg. bags for coffee; thousands of long tons for cocoa; and millions of pounds for jute.
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FIGURE 9
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Source: U. S. Treasury, Office of Raw Materia’ and Oceans, U. S. Commodity Policy (February 1976).
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which are those of the core group in the UNCTAD integrated program. He
used values for the elasticities of supply and demand, actual price and
quantity for 1971, and a hypothetical variations in supply and demand.
He used variation for supply only, for demand only and for both together.
His result is indicated in Table 23. Although consumer’s gain decreases
when supply varies, and producer’s gains decrease when demand varies,
the total gain is positive in both instances. When both demand and
supply vary, both producer’s and consumer’s gain is positive. For the
case in which both supply and demand vary, annual gains for ten of the
core group in the UNCTAD integrated programme to suppliers and buyers
are 277.4 million and $386.0 million respectively, and total gains for
the ten commodities are $663.4 million.
A buffer stock will accrue administrative costs, handling and
stomage costs. At first of course, it will accrue a cost for purchasing
of commodity to be stockpiled. To ensure adequate financing for these
costs, the UNCTAD proposal advocates the establishment of common fund
by subscriptions from importers and exporters of the core commodities
with exceptions for the poorest nations. This common fund is supposed
to avoid the particular financial difficulties of the individual
countries participating in a specific commodity agreement. It would also
pool and reduce risks and have more bargaining power in international
capital markets than could a set of individual funds for the same
commodities. For example, let us suppose that two buffer stocks are
to be operated for commodities A and B and that if these buffer stocks
were operated independently, each would require a capital of $250
million. If we assume further that the two markets are always exactly
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TABLE 23
EXPECTED ANNUAL GAINS FROM PRICE STABILIZATION
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Supply Varies Demand Varies Both Vary
Commodity Producers Consumers Total Producers Consumers Total Producers Consumer Total
Cocoa 21.4 — 7.0 14.5 — 7.5 21.9 14.5 14.0 149 28.9
Coffee 28.6 — 8.9 19.7 — 10.8 30.6 19.7 17.7 21.7 39.4
Tea 8.2 — 2.1 6.1 — 4.0 10.1 6.1 4.1 8.0 12.2
Cotton 25.8 — 5.6 20.3 — 14.7 34.9 20.3 11.2 29.4 40.5
Sugar 226.0 —67.0 159.0 — 92.1 251.1 159.0 133.9 184.2 318.1
Jute 1.6 — 0.6 1.0 — 0.4 1.4 1.0 1.2 0.7 2.0
Sisal 2.2 — 0.9 1.3 — 0.4 1.8 1.3 1.8 0.9 2.7
Rubber 15.2 — 6.4 8.8 — 2.4 11.2 8.8 12.8 4.8 17.6
Copper 114.0 —31.9 82.1 — 50.2 132.3 82.1 63.9 100.4 164.2
Tin 27.3 — 8.4 18.9 — 10.5 29.4 18.9 16.8 21.0 37.8
Wool 153.0 —50.3 102.7 — 52.4 155.1 102.7 100.6 104.8 205.4
Wheat 105.1 —18.9 86.2 — 67.2 153.4 86.2 37.9 134.5 172.3
Rice 324.2 —60.8 263.4 —202.7 466.1 263.4 121.6 405.3 526.9
Source: David L. McNicol, Commodity Agreement and Price Stabilization, Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto,
1978, p. 57.
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out of phase so that when buffer stock A is buying, buffer stock B is
selling and vice versa, the two buffer stocks could then be operated
jointly with $250 million. If the two markets were exactly in phase
with one another, then joint operation would still require $500 million.
In general, to the extent that movements in the two markets are not
perfectly correlated, the capital required to operate the two stocks
together is less than $500 million. The difference of money obtained
from the joint management of the two buffer stocks, that is $250 million
if the two markets are perfectly correlated in opposite directions or
less than 250 million if they are not perfectly correlated could be
invested in financial instruments to obtain some more funds.
A measure of how two prices move together is provided by a
correlation cofficient. If two prices move exactly together, the
correlation coefficient between them is 1.0. If they move exactly in
opposition, for example, one goes up five percent when the other goes
down five percent, the correlation between them is —1. If they tend to
move neither together nor in opposition, the correlation coefficient
is close to zero. Table 24 shows a correlation among deflated commodity
prices for the years 1951—1975. Of the seventy—eight values in the
table, thirty—eight are either negative or zero, and most of the
positive values are fairly small. Therefore, it seems that there is
a good case for pooling.
Moreover, David C. McNicol used a simulation analysis to compare
the increase in revenue with the total buffer stock expenditures for
the ten core commodities, using a ten percent bandwith for the year
1971. His conclusion is summarized in Table 25. The ratio of increased
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revenue to buffer stock expenditures in column 1 is above one which
indicates that the increase in revenue is greater than the buffer stock
expenditures. Column 3 presents rough estimates, constructed using the
fraction of the commodity exported by developing countries, of the ratio
of developing countries’ revenues to buffer stock expenditures. For all
but three of these commodities, this ratio exceeds unity which indicates
the revenue increase to developing nations is greater than the buffer
stock expenditures.
Now let us look at another simulation result for only the ten UNCTAD
core commodities, that is cocoa, coffee, tea, sugar, cotton, jute, rubber,
sisal, copper and tin for the years 1963—1975, using a fifteen percent
band around the 1950—1975 price trends . Table 27 is a summary of
a result of such simulation. Columns 1 and 2 show the value of buffer
stock activity excluding and including the final stock respectively.
The difference of these columns is the amount of commodity that is
available at the end of the simulation period multiplied by its
respective price. Columns 3 and 4 show the number of years the buffer
stock did not buy or sell respectively. Columns 5, 6 and 7 show the
mean percentage changes in price, quantity supplied and producer’s
revenue respectively. Column 8 shows the additional producer’s revenue
due to stabilization, and column 9 shows the revenue stabilization index.
Note that the value of less than one for this ratio indicates that
revenues are more stable with the price stabilization than without it.
We can note from column 8 that producer’s total revenue has increased.
As columns 7 and 8 in Table 26 indicate, the estimated average revenue
gain is highest for sugar, 23..6 percent, which translates into a
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TABLE 24
CORRELATIONS AMONG DEFLATED COMMODITY PRICES
Commodity Cocoa Coffee Tea Sugar Cotton Jute Sisal Rubber Copper Tin Wheat Rice
Coffee 0.08
Tea —.28 0.43
Sugar .33 —.24 —0.47
Cotton .30 .38 .19 0.06
Jute —.38 —.22 —.02 —.54 —0.56
Sisal .15 —.44 —.22 .82 —.13 —0.41
Rubber .09 .39 .82 —.28 .45 —.10 —0.02
Copper 0 0 —.44 —.25 —.28 .47 —.21 —0.41
Tin .06 —.39 —.55 0 —.27 .23 —.12 —.47 0.50
Wheat .41 —.32 —.39 .62 .32 —.39 .79 —.07 .08 0.13
Rice .54 -.39 —.52 .41 .08 —.18 .47 —.29 .32 .38 0.82
Wool .06 .19 .16 .15 .58 0 .13 .37 —.16 —.34 .53 0.20
Sources: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Commodity Trade and Price Trends (1975;
United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, Trade Yearbook (1974); United Nations,
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, March, 1976.
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TABLE 25
RATIO OF INCREASES IN REVENUE TO SUPPLIERS TO
BUFFER STOCK EXPENDITURE FOR A SIMPLE MODEL
Ratio of
Ratio of Increased Percent Increased Revenue
Revenue of Buffer of Commodity to LCDs to Buffer
Commodity Stock Expenditures Export by LCDs Stock Expenditures
Cocoa 1.2 99.2 1.19
Coffee 1.3 96.8 1.23
Tea 1.6 82.8 1.32
Cotton 1.2 57.9 0.69
Sugar 1.6 69.7 1.12
Jute 1.6 95.6 1.53
Sisal 1.0 97.7 0.98
Rubber 1.4 97.7 1.37
Copper 1.5 54.5 0.82
Tin 2.0 85.5 1.70
Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Commodity Trade and Price Trends (1975).
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TABLE 26
SUMMARY OF BASIC INTERNATIONAL BUFFER STOCK COMMODITY PROGRAM
SIMULATIONS FOR TEN UNCTAD CORE COMMODITIES, 1963_1975a
Source: F. Gerord Adams, Jere R. Behrman, Econometric Modeling of World Commodity Policy,
Lexington, Massachusetts, 1978, p. 161.
aA previous section presents the assumptions underlying these simulations.
bThese values are present discounted values using a five percent real discount rate and are in millions of
constant 1975 dollars.
cThe comparisons are with identical simulations except that no buffer stock activity is allowed.
dThjs is the ratio of the standard deviation in real revenues with price stabilization to that without
price stabilization.
eTotal for columns 1, 2 and 8
1~The present discounted valued is negative even though the mean percentage change in producers’ revenues
is positive because of the concentration of negative values early in the stimulation period.
Basic Simulation: + 15% Bands Around 1950—1975 Price Trends
Longest Continu
ous Periods (in
Value of Buffer years) of Buffer Mean Percentage Changes
Stock Activityb Stock Activity Due to Price Stabilization Value of
UNCTAD Excluding Including Additional Revenue
Core Final Final Without Without Quantity Producers’ Producer Stabilization
Commodities Stock Stock Buying Selling Price Supplied Revenues Revenueb,C Indexd
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cocoa —667 —70 3 6 4.2 2.9 6.7 334 0.24
Coffee —494 —413 9 4 1.5 1.0 2.4 1734 0.71
Tea —65 0 9 13 0.8 0.1 0.8 126 0.91
Sugar —13877 —6309 2 12 23.1 2.2 23.6 10609 0.22
Cotton —3735 —643 4 13 3.7 2.4 6.1 8241 0.51
Jute 0 0 13 13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 -—
Rubber —1887 —153 8 9 3.0 2.2 4.8 965 0.52
Sisal —6 —6 3 9 —2.2 0.3 —1.2 —634 0.21
Copper —508 282 8 6 0.8 —0.2 o.6f —188f 0.94
Tin 399 399 13 10 —1.8 —0.3 —2.1 —249 0.91
Averagee —20840 —6813 7.2 9.5 3.3 1.1 4.2 20938 0.57
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present discounted value of additional producer’s revenue of over ten
billion dollars. The average percentage revenue gains for other
commodities are 6.7 for cocoa, 6.1 for cotton, 4.8 for rubber, 2.4 for
coffee, 0.8 for tea, 0.6 for copper, zero for jute, —1.2 for sisal,
and 2.1 for tin. The average of these gains across ten commodities
over the thirteen year period is 4.2 percent. This translates into
almost twenty—one billion dollars for the program. Most of these
absolute gains accrue to sugar and cotton producers, with coffee and
rubber producers also benefiting on the order of magnitude of a billion
dollars. On the other hand, there are simulated small losses for the
two mineral products and larger losses for sisal. For all ten core
commodities, the present discounted value of additional producer’s
revenues exceeds the cost of buffer stock activity even if final buffer
stocks are valued at zero (column 1 and 8). On an individual basis,
the same is true for cotton, coffee and tea. For tin the positive
value of buffer stock activity exceeds the loss of producer revenue.
If final buffer stocks are valued at the post terminal price, the
additional producers’ revenues exceed the costs of buffer stock activity
by over fourteen billion 1975 dollars. On an individual basis, the
sum of the present discounted values of producers’ revenues and of the
cost of buffer stock activity are nonnegative for each commodity except
for sisal.
These comparisons point out that under the conditions of the basic
simulations, the producers would gain even if they absorbed all of the
costs of operating the buffer stocks. The gains would be larger if
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consumers shared in those costs, as is intended in the proposed UNCTAD
Integrated Commodity Program.
The simulation in Table 26 is made first with the assumption of
price bandwiths of fifteen percent. Second, this fifteen ban is around
the secular trends of 1950—1975. Third, there is an initial stock of
commodities to back the operation of the buffer stock. A sensitivity
analysis of these assumptions for alternative variants is shown in
Table 27, with the number of buffer stock interventions, value of buffer
stock activity excluding and including final stock, total financing,
percentage gains from financial pooling and additional producer’s
revenues.
First, if Bandwidths is reduced from + fiften percent to + ten
percent there is a significant increase (about thirty percent) in the
number of buffer stock interventions. This enlarged buffer stock
activity is associated with significantly expanded financing requirements
(to over twenty—two billion 1975 dollars), costs of buffer stock
operations, and gains to producers (to over thirty—six billion 1975
dollars). The gains from pooling financing remain at about one third
or thirty—four percent.
Second, if the actual secular real price trends of 1963—1975 are
used rather than those for the 1950—1975 quarter century, there is a
less frequent buffer stock intervention. This results in the fall of
cost of buffer stock operation. Total financing requirements increase
partly due to a decrease of percentage gains from pooling.
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TABLE 27
SUMMARY OF SIMULATIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE VARIANTS OF
THE UNCTAD INTEGRATED COMMODITY PROGRAM, 1963—1975
All Ten UNCTAD Core Commodities
Value of Buffer
Number Stock Activity Percentage
of Buffer Excluding Including Gains from Additional
Stock Inter— Final Final Total Financial Producer’s
Simulations ventions Stock Stock Financing Pooling Revenues
Basic Buffer Stock
Simulation + 15% Bands 59 —20840 —6813 13852 33 20938
Around 1950—1975 Trends
Variants on the Basic
Simulations
1. + 10% bands around
1950—1975 trends 76 —30989 —9984 22299 34 36665
2. + 15% bands around
1963—1975 trends 54 —19875 —568 22827 17 24844
3. + 15% bands around
5 years moving 46 —183932 —113036 240431 1 244269
average targets
4. + 15% bands around
1950—1975 trends, 53 —22549 —7996 18264 15 25686
no initial stocks
5. + 15% bands around
1950—1975 trends,
no initial stocks 46 —8569 —4097 4602 55 3412
and variable bands
Source: F. Gerald Adams and Jere R. Behrman, Econometric Modeling of World Commodity Policy, Lexington,
Massachusetts, 1978, p. 168.
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Third, if instead of fixed secular trend, a price target based
on the experience of the immediately preceding five year period is used,
there would be less buffer stock activity. A drop of a third in the
number of interventions, a drop of almost two—thirds in the additional
producer’s revenues, and a fall in the costs of buffer stock operations.
Total financing increases by over a tenth in the past due to a
substantial drop in the gains from financing pooling.
Fourth, the basic simulation assumes that these are sufficient
initial stocks to defend the price ceilings. If we do not allow initial
stocks, the number of intervention declines since there are no initial
stocks with which to offset upward price pressures. The higher prices
result in greater producer revenues by about a fifth. The costs of
buffer stock operations increase. As a result of lack of stocks, it
is impossible to sell when prices go up. Therefore, there is a decline
of over a half in the gains from pooling. This results in an increase
of total financing.
Fifth, if there is no initial buffer stock and if bandwith is
adjusted from the previous buffer stock activities around a secular
trend of 1950—1975, trends with ÷ fifteen percent bandwith, there would
be more flexibility into the buffer stock arrangements which lessens
the possibility of exhausting finances by attempting to maintain too
high a floor. Therefore, with this kind of variation buffer stock
activities decline considerably. Intrerventions drop at least a fifth
and buffer stock costs fall significantly. The gains to producers also
fall substantially, from 20.9 billion 1975 dollars to 3.4 billions dollars.
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Concl usion
The external economic relations are very important to the developing
nations. International trade can permit a country to consume outside of
its production frontier and thus increase economic welfare. Nevertheless,
frustrations have grown in the developing world. Causes for this
increased dissatisfaction include the observations or perceptions that
the gap between the developed and developing nations inevitably will
increase for decade and that the international economic order was
created by the more developed nations with their own interests, not
those of the poorer nations, primarily in mind.
In the early 1970’s, the success of the poor oil—exporting nations
in raising substantially the price of their petroleum exports and the
ensuing controversy served as a catalyst to bind the devel opi ng nations
together in a call for the establishment of a new international economic
order that better accommodates their interests.
At the heart of this call for a new international economic order
is the desire for international commodity agreements to stabilize and
perhaps to increase the prices of major primary commodity exports of
the developing countries. These desires have been systematized in the
UNCTAD proposal for an integrated commodity program.
The theoretical analysis of such program suggests that there are
net gains from international commodity agreements. However, the
distribution of these benefits depends on actual characteristics of
commodity markets.
Finally, the paper looked at several empirical works of simulations
in regard to what would happen if price stabilization were implemented
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for the core commodities suggested by UNCTAD. The results are: (1) The
developing countries would gain a present discounted value of about
at least five billion dollars from the implementation of the price
stabilization program; (2) if the secular price trends were increased,
the gains would also increase; (3) the integrated aspects of financing
would permit the shifting of funds from one commodity to another over
time and be able to pool reduce risks and have more bargaining power in
international capital markets than could a set of individual funds for
the same commodities; (4) the developed economies also would gain very
substantially from the reduction of inflationary pressures; and (5) some
nations who export certain products would be net loosers, but they could
be compensated from the total overall benefit.
APPENDIX
RESOLUTION 93 (IV) OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOMENT*
Integrated Programme for Commodities
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Recalling the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order as well as the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which lay down the
foundations of the new international economic order, General Assembly
resolution 623 (VII) of 21 December 1952 and the recommendation contained
in annex A.II.1 of the Final Act adopted at the first session of the
Conference,
Recalling, in particular, section I, 3, paragraph (a) (iv), of
the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, relating to the preparation of an over—all integrated
programme for “a comprehensive range of commodities of export interest
to developing countries,”
Recalling also section I, paragraph 3, of General Assembly resolution
3362 (S—VII) of 16 September 1975, which states, inter alia, that “an
important aim of the fourth session of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, in addition to work in progress elsewhere, should
be to reach decisions on the improvement of market structures in the
field of raw materials and commdities of export interest of the develop
ing countries, including decisions with respect to an integrated programme
and the applicability of elements thereof,”
Taking note of the work undertaken on commodities in preparation
for the fourth session of the Conference, in particular the proposals
submitted by the Secretary—General of UNCTAD for an integrated programme
for commodities,
Reaffirming the important role of UNCTAD in the field of commodities,
Bearing in mind resolution 16 (VIII) on 19 December 1975 of the
Committee of Commodities concerning decisions by the Conference at its
fourth session with respect to an integrated programme for commodities,
on, inter alia:
*The Conference adopted this resolution without dissent, May 30,
1976, Nairobi, TD/RES/93(IV). Text taken from “Report of UNCTAD on




(b) Commodities to be covered;
(c) International measures;
Cd) Follow—up procedures and time—table for the implementation of
agreed measures,
Affirming the importance to both producers and consumers, notably
the developing countries, of commodity exports for foreign exchange
earnings and of commodity imports for welfare and economic development,
Recognizing the need to conduct international trade on the basis
of mutual advantage and equitable benefits, taking into account the
interests of all States, particularly those of the developing countries,
Recognizing also the need for improved forms of international co
operation in the field of commodities which should promote economic and
social development, particularly of the developing countries,
Recognizing further the urgent need for substantial progress in
stimulating food production in developing countries and the important
bearing of international commodity policies on this aim,
Recalling the proposal in the Manila Declaration and Programme of
Action for the establishment of a common fund for the financing of
international commodity stocks, co—ordinated national stocks or other
necessary measures within the framework of commodity arrangements,
Bearing in mind the view that there might be financial savings in
operating a central facility for the purpose of financing buffer stocks,
Taking note of the readiness of a number of countries expressed
prior to and at the fourth session of the Conference, to participate in
and financially support a common fund,
Noting that there are differences of views as to the objectives and
modalities of a common fund,
Convinced of the need of an over—all approach and an integrated
programme for commodities which is a programme of global action to
improve market structures in international trade in commodities of
interest to developing countries, and which is consistent with the
interests of all countries, particularly those of the developing
countries, and assures a comprehensive view of the various elements
involved while respecting the characteristics of individual commodities,
Decides to adopt the following Integrated Programme for Commodities:
I. OBJECTIVES
With a view to improving the terms of trade of developing countries
and in order to eliminate the economic imbalance between developed and
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developing countries, concerted efforts should be made in favour of the
developing countries towards expanding and diversifying their trade,
improving and diversifying their productive capacity, improving their
productivity and increasing their export earnings, with a view to
counteracting the adverse effects of inflation, thereby sustaining real
incomes. Accordingly the following objectives are agreed:
1. To achieve stable conditions in commodity trade, including avoidance
of excessive price fluctuations, at levels which would:
(a) be remunerative and just to producers and equitable to consum
ers;
(b) take account of world inflation and changes in the world eco
nomic and monetary situations;
(c) promote equilibrium between supply and demand within expanding
world commodity trade;
2. To improve and sustain the real income of individual developing
countries through increased export earnings, and to protect them from
fluctuations in export earnings, especially from commodities;
3. To seek to improve market access and reliability of supply for
primary mary products and the processed products thereof, bearing in
mind the needs and interests of developing countries;
4. To diversify production in developing countries, including food
production, and to expand processing of primary products in developing
countries with a view to promoting their industrialization and increasing
their export earnings;
5. To improve the competitiveness of, and the encourage research and
development on the problems of, natural products competing with synthetics
and substitutes, and to consider the harmonization, where appropriate, of
the production of synthetics and substitutes in developed countries with
the supply of natural products produced in developing countries;
6. To improve market structures in the field of raw materials and
commodities of export interest to developing countries;
7. To improve marketing, distribution and transport systems for
commodity exports of developing countries, including an increase in
their participation in these activities and their earnings from them.
II. COMMODITY COVERAGE
The commodity coverage of the Integrated Programme should take into
account the interests of developing countries in bananas, bauxite, cocoa,
coffee, copper, cotton and cotton yarns, hard fibres and products, iron
ore, jute and products, maganese, meat, phosphates, rubber, sugar, tea,
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tropical timber, tin, and vegetable oils, including olive oil, and oil—
seeds, among others, it being understood that other products could be
included, in accordance with the procedure set out in section IV below.
III. INTERNATIONAL MEASURES OF THE PROGRAMME
1. It is agreed that steps will be taken, as described in section IV,
paragraphs 1 to 3, below, towards the negotiation of a common fund.
2. It is also agreed to take the following measures, to be applied
singly or in combination, including action in the context of interna
tional commodity arrangements between producers and consumers, in the
light of the characteristics and problems of each commodity and the
special needs of developing countries;
(a) Setting up of international commodity stocking arrangements;
(b) Harmonization of stocking policies and the setting up of co
ordinated national stocks;
(c) Establishment of pricing arrangements, in particular negotiated
price ranges, which would be periodically reviewed and appropriately
revised, taking into account, inter alia, movements in prices of imported
manufactured goods, exchange rates, production costs and world inflation,
and levels of production and consumption;
(d) Internationally agreed supply management measures, including
export quotas and production policies and, where appropriate, multilateral
long—term supply and purchase commitments;
(e) Improvement of procedures for information and consultation on
market conditions;
(f) Improvement and enlargement of compensatory financing facilities
for the stabilization, around a growing trend, of export earnings of
developing countries;
(g) Improvement of market access for the primary and processed
products of developing countries through multilateral trade measures in
the multilateral trade negotiations, improvement of schemes of generalized
preferences and their extension beyond the period originally envisaged,
and trade promotion measures;
(h) International measures to improve the infrastructure and indus
trial capacity of developing countries, extending from the production of
primary commodities to their processing, transport and marketing, as well
as to the production of finished manufactured goods, their transport,
distribution and exchange, including the establishment of financial,
exchange and other institutions for the remunerative management of trade
transactions;
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Ci) Measures of encourage research and development on the problems
of natural products competing with synthetics and consideration of the
harmonization, where appropriate, of the production of synthetics and
substitutes in developed countries with the supply of natural products
produced in developing countries;
(i) Consideration of special measures for commodities whose problems
cannot be adequately solved by stocking and which experience a persistent
price decline.
3. The interests of developing importing countries, particularly the
least developed and the most seriously affected among them, and those
lacking in natural resources, adversely affected by measures under the
Integrated Programme, should be protected by means of appropriate
differential and remedial measures within the Programme.
4. Special measures, including exemption from financial contributions,
should be taken to accommodate the needs of the least developed countries
in the Integrated Programme.
5. Efforts on specific measures for reaching arrangements on products’,
groups of products or sectors which, for various reasons, are not
incorporated in the first stage of application to the Integrated
Programme should be continued.
6. The application of any of the measures which may concern existing
international arrangements on commodities covered by the Integrated
Programme would be decided by governments within the commodity organi
zations concerned.
IV. PROCEDURES AND TIME—TABLE
1. The Secretary—General of UNCTAD is requested to convene a negotiating
conference open to all members of UNCTAD on a common fund no later than
March 1977.
2. The Secretary—General of UNCTAD is further requested to convene
preparatory meetings prior to the conference referred to in paragraph 1
above concerning, inter alia:
(a) Elaboration of objectives;
(b) The financing needs of a common fund and its structure;
(c) Sources of’ finance;
Cd) Mode of operations;
(e) Decision—making and fund management.
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3. Member countries are invited to transmit to the Secretary—General
of UNCTAD, prior to 30 September 1976, any proposals they may have
concerning the above and related issues.
4. The Secretary—General of UNCTAD is further requested to convene, in
consultation with international organizations concerned, preparatory
meetings for international negotiations on indivdual products, in the
period beginning 1 September 1976. These meetings should complete their
work as soon as possible, but not later than February 1978. The task of
the preparatory meetings shall be to:
(a) Propose appropriate measures and techniques required to achieve
the objectives of the Integrated Programme;
(b) Determine financial requirements resulting from the measures
and techniques proposed;
(c) Recommend follow—up action required through the negotiation of
commodity agreements, or other measures;
(d) Prepare draft proposals of such agreements for the consideration
of governments and for use in commodity negotiating conferences.
5. The Secretary—General of UNCTAD is further requested to convene, as
and when required, commodity negotiating conferences as soon as possible
after the completion of each preparatory meeting held pursuant to para
graph 4 above. These negotiations should be concluded by the end of
1978.
6. The Secretary—General of UNCTAD is requested to undertake the neces
sary arrangements for the servicing of the preparatory meetings and the
subsequent commodity negotiating conferences, in co—operation with the
secretariats of the specialized commodity bodies and other organizations
concerned.
7. It is agreed that international negotiations or renegotiations on
individual commodities covered by existing agreements shall be in accor
dance with appropriate established procedures for the purpose of conclud
ing international arrangements.
8. The Trade and Development Board is instructed to establish an ad hoc
intergovernmental committee to co—ordinate the preparatory work and the
negotiations, to deal with major policy issues that may arise, including
commodity coverage, and to co—ordinate the implementation of the measures
under the Integrated Programme.
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